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From the BanJ<ruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick,**
ENFORCEABILITY OF LETTERS
OF CREDIT WHEN THE
CUSTOMER IS IN BANKRUPTCY:
FROM TWIST CAP TO AIR
CONDITIONING

ticularly in the warm Southern
District of Florida. A quotation
fron'i a philosopher: ''A metaphor
is a terrible thing to waste."

The Twist Cap case' gave the
business community a jolt with
respect to letters of credit that it
had had difficulty in overcoming,
untjl the arrival of the Page 2 and
M.J. Sales cases 3 smoothed that
disturbance. All was quiet in the
realm of letters of credit until the
arrival of the' Air Conditioning of
Stuart case, 4 in which the court
canceled a letter of credit as a
voidable preference. If the Twist
Cap case was easy to unscrew, we
find that the Air Conditioning case
presented no cause for alarm, par-

Twist Cap

• Counsel to the law firm of Levin &
Weintraub & Crames, New York City;
member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
**Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra
University School of Law: Hempstead,
New York· Counsel to the law firm of
Berkman, Henoch, Peterson, Kadin &
Peddy, Garden City, New York; member
of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
• In re Twist Cap, Inc., 1 Bankr. 284
(S.D. Fla. 1979).
2 In re Page, 18 Bankr. 713 (D.D.C.
1982).
J In re M.J. Sales & Distrib. Co., 25
Bankr. 608 (S.D. N.Y. 1982).
4 In re Air Conditioning of Stuart, Inc.,
55 Bankr. 157 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (see addendum).
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Twist Cap, Inc., entered into a
security agreement in March 1978
with the Southern Bank to' secure
letters of credit issued by the bank
on behalf of Twist Cap. The bank
issued three letters of credit: one
for $30,000 issued prior to the security agreement and payable to
Aluminum Company of America
(Alcoa), one for $30,000 issued in
June 1978 payable to Alcoa, and
one for $25,000 issued in March
1979 payable to Central Can Co.
(Central). On August 22, 1979,
Twist Cap filed a petition for relief
under Chapter XI of the former
Bankruptcy Act and, only six
days later, Twist Cap as debtor in
possession filed a complaint and
obtained a temporary restraining
order prohibiting the bank from
honoring the three letters of credit
until a (ull hearing could be held.
Alcoa and Central, which were
added as defendants, moved to
dismiss the complaint challenging
the court's subject matter jurisdiction. They contended that the letters of credit were not "properties
of the debtor", and that the bank-
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ruptcy court's jurisdiction was
limited under Section 311 of the
old Bankruptcy Act to "properties of the debtor.''
The debtor's position was that
the court's jurisdiction depended
on whether the letters outstanding
in the hands of third parties were
secured by properties of the
debtor. The court agreed with the
debtor, stating that it "is clear
that these letters of credit are in
fact secured by properties of the
debtor and that if they are honored by the Bank, the Bank will
assert that the properties of the
debtor included in the collateral
previously pledged secured all indebtedness of the debtor owed
to the Bank including the sums
paid out by the Bank in honoring
the letters of credit." 5 Moreover, whether or not Section 311
applied as the basis of jurisdiction
was immaterial to the court because of the court's broad injunctive powers under Section 2a(15)
of the Act.
Most disturbing to the business
community was that the Twist
Cap court also justified the issuance of a temporary restraining
order by reasoning that "to permit
these two unsecured creditors to
receive a payment, possibly in
full, on the pre-petition indebtedness owed to them by the debtor
would amount to an impermissible
preferential treatment of these

5

1 Bankr. at 285.

97

two unsecured creditors which is
contrary to the scheme of Chapter
XI and would certainly be counterproductive to the debtor's efforts to obtain rehabilitation. " 6
Although the court made it
clear that "the~e conclusions
should not be construed to be a
determination of the debtor's ultimate right to stop payment of
these letters of credit" 7 and that
the court intended only to preserve the status quo until the hearing on the merits (which was
never held because the case was
settled), 8 the court's mere suggestion that the letters of credit
may be canceled as a voidable
preference had a potentially chilling effect on the vitality of letters
of credit. This was- especially
alarming because the letters were
issued and the debtor signed a security agreement with the batik
before the crucial four-month
preference period under the
former Act. Even a temporary
delay in the ability of a creditor to
cash an outstanding letter of
credit can erode the business
community's confidence in these
previously invulnerable devices. 9
6 I d.; see former Bankruptcy Act § 60
(voidable preference).
'
7 Twist Cap, 1 Bankr. at 286.
8 See J. Dolan, The Law of Letters of
Credit ~ 703[l][a] (Boston: Warren, Gorham & Lamont, 1984).
9 For commentary criticizing the Twist
Cap decision, see, e.g., Baird, "Standby
Letters of Credit in Bankruptcy," 49 U.
Chi. L. Rev. !30 (1982); Chaitman &
Sovem, "Enjoining Payment on a Letter
of Credit in Bankruptcy: A Tempest in a
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Sections 362 and 549 as Applied to
Letters of Credit: The Page Case

The disturbance caused by Twist
Cap was reduced to some extent
r

when the district court in In re
Page 10 rejected new attacks on
letters of credit based on Section
.362 11 aut9matic stay provisions
and Secti~n 549 12 postpetition
transfer restrictions under the
Bankruptcy Code.
\\ZestinghouseCreditCorp. (WCC)
was a substantial creditor of Page
Associates, a limited partnership,
and Virginia Page, its sole general
partner. In addition to holding a
deed of trust on Page Associates'
hotel, wee held a $500,000 letter
of credit issued by First National
Bank of Maryland. As a condition
of issuing the letter of credit to
WCC, the bank required Mrs.
Page and Page Associates to agree
to indemnify the bank in the event
that wee cashed the letter of
credit. As security for the indemnification agreement, Page Associates pledged a $100,000 certifi9ate of deposit with the bank
and Mrs. Page gave the bank a
second deed o( trust on her residence which was · properly recorded.
Subsequently, Page Associates
and Mrs. Page filed chapter 11 peTwist Cai;>," }8 Bus. Law. 21 (1982);
McLaughhn, Letters of Credit as Preferential Transfers in Bankruptcy," 50 Fordham L. Rev. 1033 (1982).
10
18 Bankr. 713 (D.D.C. 1982)
II 11 U.S.C. § 362.
.
12 11 u.s.c. § 549.
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··titions in 1981. Only four days
later, wee presented the letter of
credit to the bank for payment.
The following day, the debtor filed
a complaint and motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the bank's honoring of the
letter ~f credit. The bankruptcy
court Issued the temporary restraining order and, after a hearing, entered a preliminary injunction precluding wee from cashing the letter of credit until further
order.
The bankruptcy court enjoined
payment of the letter of credit on
three grounds: (1) payment would
be a postpetition transfer in violation of Section 549 of the Code,
(2) payment would constitute a
transfer of assets in violation of
the Section 362 automatic stay,
~nd (3) payment would ''severely
Jeopardize the filing of a successful Plan of Reorganization under
chapter 11." 13
Fortunately for those who regularly rely on letters of credit as a
means of doing business, the district court reversed the bankruptcy court's decision and set
aside the preliminary injunction.
First, the district court noted that
Section 362(a)(3) which applies
the automatic stay to acts to obtain possession of "property of
the estate" was not applicable in
this case. "[C]ashing the letter of
credit will not divest the estate of
13
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Page, 18 Bankr; at 715.
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property since neither the letter of
credit nor its proceeds are property of the estate .... In issuing
the letter of credit the Bank en·tered into an independent contractual obligation to pay wee out of
its own assets." 14 Moreover, although cashing the letter will give
the bank the right to pursue indemnification against the debtors,
the debtors would not be divested
of property because the enforcement of that secured claim would
be stayed under Section 362(a)
(4).

The district court also rejected
the contention that cashing the
letter of credit would violate
Section 362(a)(4)' s prohibition
against ''any act to create, perfect
or enforce any lien against property of the estate." 15 The bank's
liens on the debtors' assets to secure the indemnification agreement were created and perfected
before the chapter 11 case was
commenced. The court viewed
the arrangement as a lien created
to secure future advances, which
is valid against a bankruptcy
trustee. "Since perfected liens already exist cashing of the letter of
credit cannot have the effect of
either creating or perfecting a
lien." 16 Also, cashing the letter of
credit is not an act to "enforce" a
lien, despite the fact that honoring
it would trigger the bank s se1

' 4 Id.; see also In re Clothes, 35 Bankr.
487 (D. N.D. 1983).
IS 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4).
16 Page, IS Bankr. at 716.

cured claim against the debtor
because the bank would be automatically stayed from enforcing
its claim.
The district court also found
that the bankruptcy court's reliance on Section 549 was misplaced. That section prohibits
postpetition transfers of property
of the estate under certain circumstances. The court held that
section inapplicable because the
"letter of credit and its proceeds
represent property of the Bank,
not the debtors.'' 17
The bankruptcy court's finding
that cashing the letter of credit
would jeopardize the reorganization case was also rejected by the
district court. The bank's right to
proceed against the debtors after
honoring the letter would be automatically stayed. •'Thus the
debtors will be provided adequate
breathing space to attempt to
work out their financial affairs
as intended by the Bankruptcy
Code." 18 In addition, the compromising of claims needed for a
successful reorganization plan can
be achieved by modifying claims
of the bank as well as other
creditors. Therefore, the debtors'
chances of successfully reorganizing would not be destroyed by the
cashing of the letter of credit.
Most comforting to the business
community was that the district
court emphasized the importance
I

'' Id.
Id. at 717.

1s
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of protecting the reliability of letters of credit as financing devices.
"[E]njoining the payment of the
letter of credit, ev.pn temporarily,
would frustrate the commercial
purposes of letters of credit to the
detriment of financial institutions
as well as their customers. " 19 The
court commented further that "if
payment on a letter of credit could
,be routinely delayed by the filing
of a Chapter 11 petition the intended substitution of a bank for
its less credit-worthy customer
would be defeated. As a consequence the letter of credit would
become a dubious device for securing credit. " 20 Reconciling the
commercial world of letters of
credit and federal bankruptcy policy, the court concluded that
"where, as here, the goals of the
Bankruptcy Code can be achieved
without producing this unfortunate result there is obviously no
reason not to allow the letter of
credit to be cashed according to
its terms. " 21
M.J. Sales: A Step-by-Step
Approach
The vitality of letters of credit
presented for payment after the
commencement of a bankruptcy
case~was explored further in In re
M.J. Sales & Distributing Co.,
Inc. 22 The opening words of the

bankruptcy court's opinion are
worth noting: ••An anticipated
problem, with shades of In re
Twist Cap . . . prompts the
trustee in bankruptcy to join in the
request" for an order staying actions involving a letter of credit. 23
Therm-O-Ware Electric Corporation had sued and obtained a default judgment against the debtor,
M.J. Sales & Distributing Company, Inc., in 1979. The default
judgment was vacated on condition that M.J. Sales post a surety
bond, which it obtained from
Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, to guarantee payment of
any judgment that Therm-O-Ware
may recover against M.J. Sales.
As consideration and security for
Aetna's issuance of the bond,
M.J. Sales obtained, for the benefit of Aetna, an irrevocable letter of credit in the amount of
$25,234, dated October 16, 1979,
issued by Bankers Trust Company. Aetna had the right pursuant to the terms of the letter of
credit to obtain funds when, in
Aetna's sole judgment as surety,
such funds are required for Aetna's protection. The letter of
credit, which was assigned and
assumed by Republic National
Bank, was secured with a treasury
bond posted by M.J. Sales. All of
these transactions took place almost two years before an involuntary chapter 7 petition was filed

19Jd.
20

ld.

21Jd.
22
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23

25 Bankr. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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Id. at 609.
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against M.J. Sales on May 6,
1981.

At the time of the filing of the
involuntary petition, there was
still pending the suit by ThermO-Ware against M.J. Sales for
which the Aetna surety bond had
been issued. Therm-O-Ware's
complaint to lift the automatic
stay in order to continue its suit in
the state court was granted by the
b~nkruptcy court without prejudice to the trustee to commence a
proceeding to recover any preferentialpayments. However, M.J.
Sales admitted that no further defense would be made in the state
~ourt action. Eventually, a second
Judgment was entered , against
M.J. Sales in the state court action. Aetna demanded that Bankers Trust pay the letter of credit
to cover its obligation under the
bond. Bankers Trust responded
that the letter of credit had been
sold to Republic National Bank
which assumed all liability under
it.
A complex web of litigation in
several courts followed, but most
significantly, the trustee obtained
a temporary restraining order
from. the bankruptcy court preventmg Republic National from
releasing any funds pursuant to
the letter of credit. At the subsequeQ.t hearing, the court determined that the stay should continue in order to allow the trustee
or Republic National to institute
an adversary proceeding to determine the rights and obligations

of the parties with respect to the
letter of credit and the debtor's
treasury bond held by Republic
National as security for the letter
of credit.
The Four-Step Progression
In analyzing the rights of the
various parties, the bankruptcy
court ,construed the problem
as a ''four-steP. progression'' of
events: (1) the debtor's pledging
the treasury bond as collateral to
obtain the letter of credit to support the Aetna bond to vacate the
default judgment, (2) Therm-OWare's state suit against Aetna to
recover under the Aetna bond for
its postpetition second judgment
against M.J. Sales, (3) Aetna's resort to the letter of credit in order
to be reimbursed for payments required under the surety bond, and
(4) Republic's recourse against
the collateral pledged by the
debtor as consideration for the issuance of the letter of credit.
As to step 1, the debtor's pledging of its treasury bond as collateral, the court rejected the trustee's contention that the pledge
was a voidable preference. The
court found that the pledge of the
treasury bond occurred more than
ninety days before the filing of
the petition and, therefore, could
not be a preference under Section547(b)(4)(A).24 Moreover, the
pledge was protected from prefer-
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II U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A).
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ence attack because it was a con- 'avoid a transfer of property of the
temporaneous exchange under estate ... that occurs after the
Section 547(c)(l) in that it was commencement of the case' will
given in consideration for the con- not come into play" (emphasis
tempora~eous issuance of the let- added). A similar challenge based
ter of credit. 25 Also, the court on Section 547(d) was answered
found that the pledge was a trans- by indicating that that section
fer in the ordinary coursJ! of busi- prohibited only transfers of the
ness within the scope of Section debtor's property.
547(c)(2). 26 Nor was the trustee's
Step 3 dealt with Aetna's reimargument under Section 547(d) 27 bursement by the letter of credit.
(permitting a trustee to avoid Aetna would pay the judgment
transfers of the debtor's property creditor, Therm-O-Ware, only if
that were made 'to reimburse a Aetna would be reimbursed by the
surety that furnished a bond to letter of credit in its favor which
qissolve a judicial lien that would the debtor caused Bankers Trust
have been avoidable as a prefer- to issue. Therefore, the court conence) tenable since the judgmeftt sidered whether .any Bankruptcy
having been entered more than Code provisions prohibited payninety days before bankruptcy ment to Aetna pursuant to the letcould not have been avoided.
ter of credit for which Republic
As to step 2, Therm-O-Ware's National was liable.
state suit against Aetna to recover
Originally it was thought that In re
on the surety bond on account of
Twist Cap, Inc., 1 B.R. 284 (Bkrtcy.
the postpetition judgment entered
Fla 1979) stood for the flat proposiagainst M.J. Sales, the trustee artion
that the honoring of letters of
gued that the debtor's intervening
credit
obtained by a debtor for the
bankruptcy prevented Thermbenefit of an unsecured creditor
O-Ware from looking to the Aetwould create a preference in favor
na bond for satisfaction of its
of such creditor.... [T]he court
postpetition judgment obtained
did not hold that if the letters of
against the debtor. However, the
credit were honored, the benecourt indicated that payment by
ficiary would receive a preference.
Aetna to Therm-O-Ware would
... The court merely declared that
not reduce the assets of the estate
a temporary restraining order
should issue in order' to preserve
since Aetna would be paying out
the status quo pending a determinaof its own funds. Thus, Section
tion on the merits. The 'court ap549(a) "which permits a trustee to
25

26
27

peared to be influenced by the fact
that the bank held collateral of the
debtor to "secure its obligations
under the letters of credit. However, the diminution in the debtor's

11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(l).
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2).
11 U.S.C.' § 547(d).
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estate occurred more than ninety
days before the petition was filed,
at the time when the collateral was
pledged; not when the bank looked
to its collateral for reimbursement
in the post-petition period. 28

In this connection, the court
observed the function played by
the letter of credit in the commercial world.
A bank honors a letter of credit and
pays the beneficiary with its own
funds, and not with assets belonging to the debtor who caused the
letter of credit to be issued .... [A]
letter of credit represents an irrevocable obligation by an issuing
bank to pay the beneficiary in accordance with its terms; despite
. . . defenses against the beneficiary not apparent on the face of
the letter of credit. 29

Comparing the letter of credit
with a guarantee, the court held
that there was no preference to
the holder of a guarantee when
paid by the guarantor, notwithstanding the bankruptcy of the obligor whose performance was
guaranteed. Indeed, the court followed and quoted extensively
from the decision in the Page 30
case. Since the funds from which
Republic National must pay the
letter of credit did not constitute
property of the estate, there were
no provisions of the Code that
would stand in the way of honoring the letter of credit.

Step 4 in the series of transactions was referred to by the court
as the "most critical aspect in this
case" which "goes to the heart of
the trustee's position. " 31 This
step dealt with Republic's recourse to the pledged collateral
(the treasury bond) after Republic
pays the letter of credit. The
trustee argued that Therm-OWare could not levy upon the
debtor's property because of the
automatic stay under Section
362(a)(3) and (4). Therefore,
Therm-O-Ware should not be
permitted to benefit indirectly
from the debtor's pledge of the
treasury bond. The indirect benefit would result when Republic
National looks to the treasury
bond after payment to Aetna
under the letter of credit which in
turn permitted Aetna to pay
Therm-O-Ware under its bond.
Thus, the Aetna bond and the
letter of credit were conduits
permitting Therm-O-Ware to do
indirectly what it could not do directly. However, the court rejected the trustee's position.
"This argument elides the point
that Republic National is similarly
prevented by the automatic
stay as expressed in 11 U .S.C.
§ 362(a)(4), from recourse to
the debtor's pledged treasury
bond. " 32
This fourth step also offended
the trustee's perception that the

zs M.J. Sales, 25 Bankr. at 613-614.
29 /d. at 614.
3o See 18 Bankr. at 713.

31
32
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M.J. Sales, 25 Bankr. at 615.
!d.
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debtor's property should not be
transferred postpetition. However, referring again to Section
549(a)(l), the court stated that
Republic's liquidation of the treasury bond was not a postpetition
transfer of an interest in the debtor's property. A security''interest
in ''the treasury bond was transferred by pledge . . . more
than a year and one-half before
this chapter 7 case was commenced."33
Therefore, the court in M.J.
Sales concluded that the trustee
could not avoid any of the transfers in that case and that there
were no provisions in the Bankruptcy Code that would preclude
the immediate payment by Republic National to Aetna pursuant to
the letter of credit.
Cancellation of a Letter of Credit
as a Preference: The Air
Conditioning Case
In contrast to the M.J. Sales
step-by-step approach to the problem of determining whether any
aspect of a let!er of credit transaction is voidable, the bankruptcy
court in the Air Conditioning case
canceled a letter of credit by viewing all aspects of the transaction
as "a single contemporaneous
transaction" 34 that had a preferential effect within the crucial
ninety-day preference period. Js
33

Id. at 616.
34 55 Bankr. at 159.
3s See ll U.S.C. § 547(b).
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On May 10, 1984, a creditor,
Leasing Services, obtained . a
judgment against the debtor for
$40,447 on account of an antecedent debt. On April 24 and May 9,
two writs of replevin were obtained by the creditor to collect on
the same claim. The first writ was
executed on the debtor's equipment, but by stipulations .signed in
June, the parties agreed to replace
the unexecuted writ of replevin
with a $20,000 letter of credit issued by American Bank of Martin
County on June 15, 1984. In consideration for issuance of the letter of credit, the debtor gave the
bank its note dated the same day
in the sum of $20,000 secured by
the assignment and delivery to the
bank of the debtor's $20,000 certificate of deposit.
Only one month later, on July
25, the debtor filed a chapter 7
petition. The bank filed an interpleader action asking the court
to determine whether it owed
$20,000 to the trustee or to the
judgment creditor. The trustee
claimed that the transactions constituted a voidable preference and
that the $20,000 certificate of deposit belonged to the trustee.
However, the judgment creditor
argued that the first element of
Section 547(b)3 6 was not satisfied
because the creditor received only

36 ll U.S.C. § 547(b) provides that a
"trustee may avoid any transfer of an
interest of the debtor in property (l) to or
for the benefit of a creditor. . . . "
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the letter of credit which was the
bank's property, not the debtor's.
The court was urged to reason
that during the ninety-day prepetition period, the only property
transferred by the debtor was the
certificate of deposit given to the
bank for the contemporaneous issuance of a letter of credit. That
is, there was no antecedent debt
owed to the_ bank which was the
transferee of the property. Then,
the bank gave the judgment creditor its letter of credit which was
not the debtor's property.
However, the court agreed with
the trustee that the "letter of
credit was but a part of a single contemporaneous transaction
which included (a) the debtor's
note to the bank (which bore the
notation that its purpose was to
establish the letter of credit) and
(b) the assignment of the debtor's
certificate of deposit. " 37 The
court considered the intentions of
both parties that $20,000 additional collateral for the antecedent
debt be furnished to the creditor
through the bank as intermediary.
"This composite transaction was
a transfer of the debtor's property
for the creditor's benefit. " 38
It is important to point out that
the first element of Section 547(b)
is that the transfer of the debtor's
property is "to or for the benefit
of creditor." Thus, it is not necessary for the transfer to be made
to a creditor by the debtor.

a

37

Air Conditioning, 55 Bankr. at 159.

38

/d.

Clearly, a transfer made to a
non-creditor may constitute a
preference if it would benefit a
creditor and the remaining elements of Section 547(b) are met.
The creditor also argued that
the transfer of the certificate of
deposit was protected by Section
547(c)(l) as "a contemporaneous
exchange for new value given to
the debtor. " 39 The alleged "new
value" was the creditor's agreement not to proceed with execution of the writ of replevin. This
argument was rejected easily.
"Forbearance is not 'new value'
as defined in § 547(a)(2). " 4 0
The court, based on Section
547, nullified the entire letter of
credit transaction. The debtor's
note given to the bank, the debtor's assignment of its certificate of
deposit, and the bank's letter of
credit (each in the amount of
$20,000), were canceled. The
bank was ordered to deliver
the certificate of deposit to the
trustee.
A Blessing in Disguise

Although this result is consistent with the spirit of Section
547(d), 41 the Air Conditioning decision may be viewed as significant in that it renders letters of
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(l).
Air Conditioning, 55 Bankr. at 159.
1 II U.S.C. § 547(d) provides as' follows:
39
40

4

(d) The trustee may avoid a transfer of
an interest in property of the debtor
transferred to or for the benefit of a
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credit vulnerable to a preference
attack. However, its holding is
limited to cases where within
ninety days prior to bankruptcy, a
letter of credit is issued to a creditor on account of an antecedent
debt t)lat is at least partially unsecured and owed by an insolvent
debtor who within the ninety-day
period also gives the bank collateral to secure the debtor's obligation to reimburse the bank when
the letter of credit is honored.
This decision makes good sense
because the effect of the transaction is to give the creditor greater
rights than it would otherwise
have by transferring the debtor's
assets to the bank issuing the letter of credit on the eve of bankruptcy.
It is also worth noting that the
result in Air Conditioning does
not adversely affect the bank because its 'obligation to honor the
letter of credit was canceled. In
fact, Air Conditioning is a blessing
in disguise for banks as well as for
debtors in possession and trustees. If the transaction was not nullified, the bank would have had
to pay the creditor $20,000 but
would be automatically stayed
from pr~ceeding ag<P.nst the cash
surety to secure reimbursement of such
a surety that furnished a bond or other
obligation to dissolve a judicial lien that
would have been avoidable by the
trustee under subsection (b) of this section. The liability of such surety under
such bond or obligation shall be discharged to the extent of the value of
such property recovered by the trustee
or the amount paid to the trustee.
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collateral which may be subject to
the debtor's use under Section
363(c)(2)(B), as long as the bank
is adequately protected. 42 The
only party hurt by the court's
decision was the creditor who
should stand in the same shoes as
any other creditor receiving a
preferential transfer within the
ninety-day preference period. 43
Addendum

Since this article was submitted
to the Journal, an appeal to the
district court resulted in a reversal
in part of the decision of the bankruptcy court. In effect, the district
court held that the bank was to
honor the letter of credit, satisfy
its own claim out of the $20,000
certificate of deposit, and leave
the trustee to pursue the collection of the preference against
Leasing Services. It is noteworthy
that the New York Clearing
House filed a brief as an amicus
curiae urging that the nullifying of
a letter of credit was contrary to
"well established legal precedent. " 44 We ·await the decision
of the Court of Appeals for the
Third Cir~uit.
42
11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2)(B); see also 11
U.S.C. § 362(a)(4).
43 See Gross & Borowitz, "A New
Twist on Twist Cap: Invalidating a Preferential Letter of Credit in In re Air Conditioning," 103 Banking L.J. 368 (1986), approving the decision of the Air Conditioning case as "correctly [harmonizing] the
policies underlying letter:-of-credit law and
bankruptcy preference law.''
44 Leasing Servs. Corp. v. Wendell,_
Bankr. _(S.D. Fla. 1987) (appeal pending
at the Eleventh Circuit).
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